---
title: "Apple User Not Found Bounces: Check Your Suppression List"
description: "Apple user not found bounces, Nov 17, 2026: SparkPost says Apple sent 550 5.1.1 to valid addresses. Check the suppression list you keep."
publishedAt: 2026-11-21
tags: ["deliverability", "smtp", "troubleshooting", "transactional-email", "aggregate-reports"]
faq:
  - question: "What does 550 5.1.1 user not found mean?"
    answer: "A 550 5.1.1 reply is a permanent refusal: RFC 3463 §3.2 defines X.1.1 as a bad destination mailbox address, and RFC 5321 §4.2.1 says the sender should not repeat the exact request. Sending services treat it as a hard bounce and suppress the address. On November 17, 2026, SparkPost said Apple returned it for valid recipients."
  - question: "Did Apple confirm what caused the bounces?"
    answer: "No. We found no Apple statement about the bounces. MacRumors reports that Apple told Bloomberg an internal update caused outages the same day and that it was not a cyberattack. No source we found links that outage to the bounces."
  - question: "Which Apple addresses were affected?"
    answer: "SparkPost's confirmed scope is privaterelay.appleid.com, the Sign in with Apple relay. Neither provider lists another affected domain: Mailgun's page and SparkPost's first update say iCloud addresses without naming a domain. Check icloud.com, me.com, mac.com, private.icloud.com and any domain whose MX is mx01 or mx02.mail.icloud.com."
  - question: "Is Apple still returning the errors?"
    answer: "SparkPost's last statement, its postmortem posted at 00:06 UTC on November 18, 2026, says Apple was still returning some of these errors intermittently. We found no later statement from SparkPost or Mailgun saying they stopped."
  - question: "Will my provider's cleanup fix my own suppression list?"
    answer: "Not by itself. SparkPost says its cleanup covered only its own list and that senders who keep their own may need to remove the affected addresses there too. Mailgun's page says its addresses were removed from suppression lists and does not mention lists a sender keeps."
  - question: "Should I unsuppress every iCloud address?"
    answer: "No. For privaterelay.appleid.com, the domain SparkPost confirmed, remove only entries created in your provider's window with the user not found text whose address delivered before. Other Apple domains need a second signal, because no provider names them. Apple's developer support says a 550 5.1.1 unknown user reply from the relay likely means forwarding was turned off. Unsubscribes and complaints stay suppressed."
  - question: "What are privaterelay.appleid.com and private.icloud.com?"
    answer: "privaterelay.appleid.com is the relay domain for Sign in with Apple addresses. Apple said in August 2026 that new relay addresses would be issued on private.icloud.com starting later in 2026 and that existing ones keep working. Apple's June notice asked email providers to add private.icloud.com to filtering and suppression rules; Apple now marks it outdated. Apple's support page for Sign in with Apple says a Hide My Email address is created on private.icloud.com or privaterelay.appleid.com."
  - question: "Would DMARC reports have shown this?"
    answer: "No. DMARC aggregate reports carry authentication results, not a recipient server's replies, and Apple's postmaster page documents no aggregate reporting. None of the aggregate reports that reach DMARCguard for its own domains comes from Apple. The bounces appear in your bounce events and suppression list. Nothing on SparkPost's or Mailgun's pages links authentication to them."
---
# Apple's "User Not Found" Bounces: Check the Suppression List You Keep

<TLDR>
  On November 17, 2026, SparkPost says, Apple's mail servers answered valid
  recipients with permanent `550 5.1.1 user not found` replies. Mailgun's
  incident calls "user not found" responses for Apple addresses erroneous.
  SparkPost says its cleanup covered only its own list; Mailgun's page does not
  say. We found no Apple statement about the bounces.

  Check the list you keep: remove an Apple entry only if it was created in your
  provider's window, carries that reply and its address delivered before;
  outside `privaterelay.appleid.com`, also require a second signal.
  Unsubscribes and complaints stay suppressed. DMARC aggregate reports (RFC
  9990) cannot show this: they report authentication results, not a recipient
  server's replies. Find recipients Apple hosts with the [MX
  lookup](/tools/mx-lookup/).
</TLDR>

Apple user not found bounces leave a trace: an address that received your mail
before November 17 may sit on a suppression list under a reply that reads like a
final answer, and it stays there until the entry expires or someone removes it.
The recipient is what you lose in the meantime.

Remove an Apple entry only if it carries the user not found text, was created in
the window your provider gives for when it suppressed Apple addresses (or from
your first such reply on November 17 if it gave none), and the address delivered
before; for Apple domains other than
`privaterelay.appleid.com`, the Sign in with Apple relay, also find a second
signal. Never remove unsubscribes or complaints. The eight steps are under the
heading on checking and cleaning the list you keep.

## What did Apple's mail servers return on November 17?

An SMTP (RFC 5321) reply is the answer a receiving server gives a sending one.

[SparkPost says](https://status.sparkpost.com/incidents/3z1rcmg1xsdb) that starting on
the morning of November 17, Apple's mail servers returned a large number of user-not-found bounces
for iCloud and Hide My Email (Private Relay) addresses that are valid, and that
this was an issue on Apple's side.

The reply, as SparkPost prints it, is `550 5.1.1 <address>: user not found`, bounce
class 10. In its update of November 17, 20:40 UTC, SparkPost names
`privaterelay.appleid.com` as its confirmed scope and says Apple returned the
errors in several waves, with volume well below its peak but still occurring.
SparkPost says valid recipients may have landed on suppression lists because the
bounces looked like permanent failures.

[Mailgun's incident](https://status.mailgun.com/incidents/dk98825mys2s) names iCloud and
Private Relay addresses and calls the responses erroneous. Its page gives no
domain list, no window, no cause and no SMTP reply code. We found no Apple
statement about the bounces, and no page says which step of the SMTP
conversation returned the reply.

Separately, [AppleInsider reports](https://appleinsider.com/articles/26/11/17/icloud-account-login-icloud-mail-services-are-having-trouble-today) that
Apple's status page listed iCloud Account & Sign In, iCloud Mail and iCloud.com
entries that day. [MacRumors reports](https://www.macrumors.com/2026/11/17/apple-outage-internal-update/) that
Apple told Bloomberg an internal update caused outages and that it was not a
cyberattack. No source we found links that outage to the bounces, and it is not
shown to be the cause.

## Which Apple addresses were affected: privaterelay.appleid.com, icloud.com or private.icloud.com?

SparkPost confirmed `privaterelay.appleid.com`. Neither provider lists an
affected domain besides it: Mailgun's page and SparkPost's first update say
iCloud addresses without naming a domain. So check all of them, including
`me.com`, `mac.com`, `private.icloud.com` and custom domains hosted on iCloud.
The table lists the MX hosts each one uses.

<DataTable caption="Apple recipient domains to check, with the MX hosts each one publishes.">

| Domain or family               | What it is                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     | MX                                            | What the sources say about November 17                                                                                                           |
| ------------------------------ | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| `privaterelay.appleid.com`     | Sign in with Apple relay addresses. [Apple said in August](https://developer.apple.com/news/?id=1ptvdtcm) that new ones would move to `private.icloud.com` later in 2026 and that existing ones keep working; its [support page](https://support.apple.com/en-us/105078) now lists both domains                                                | `smtp1.privaterelay.appleid.com, smtp2.privaterelay.appleid.com, smtp3.privaterelay.appleid.com, smtp4.privaterelay.appleid.com` | SparkPost's confirmed scope. The only domain in SparkPost's incident of August 26 to August 27 too                                                         |
| `private.icloud.com`           | The new relay domain. [Apple's June notice](https://developer.apple.com/news/?id=sus6t6ab) told email providers to add it to filtering, suppression lists and routing rules; Apple now marks that notice outdated, so read it as June guidance | `smtp1.private.icloud.com`       | Not reported either way. [Apple's support page](https://support.apple.com/en-us/105078) says a Sign in with Apple Hide My Email address is created on this domain or on `privaterelay.appleid.com` |
| `icloud.com`                   | iCloud mailboxes, and the addresses of iCloud+ Hide My Email, which stay on this domain. A Hide My Email alias cannot be told from a mailbox by its domain                                                                              | `mx01.mail.icloud.com, mx02.mail.icloud.com`               | Mailgun's page and SparkPost's first update name iCloud addresses; SparkPost's confirmed scope is the relay only. Unresolved. SparkPost's August incident left it unaffected |
| `me.com`, `mac.com`            | Addresses or aliases of the same iCloud account, [depending on when it was created](https://support.apple.com/en-in/118230)                                                                                                                    | `mx01.mail.icloud.com, mx02.mail.icloud.com`                   | As `icloud.com`                                                                                                                                  |
| A custom domain on iCloud Mail | A domain you own, [pointed at iCloud Mail](https://support.apple.com/en-au/102374)                                                                                                                                                             | `mx01.mail.icloud.com or mx02.mail.icloud.com`                    | No provider page we read says custom domains were affected. Find them by MX                                                                      |

</DataTable>

"Hide My Email" names two features. The
[Sign in with Apple option](https://support.apple.com/en-us/105078) creates
addresses on `privaterelay.appleid.com` or `private.icloud.com`. The iCloud+
feature issues addresses on `icloud.com`; Apple's August update says
“iCloud+ Hide My Email addresses will remain on icloud.com”.
[iCloud Private Relay](https://support.apple.com/en-us/102602) is a third thing:
Apple describes it as part of iCloud+ that helps protect your privacy when you
browse the web in Safari.

Our reading: the relay and the mailboxes use separate inbound hosts, and a
custom domain on iCloud Mail shares the mailbox hosts. That is why a filter on
Apple's domain names can miss a custom domain. Neither point is a finding about
the incident.

To find custom domains, look up each recipient domain's MX with the
[MX lookup](/tools/mx-lookup/), or run a list of domains through the script
below.

```bash

```

## Why does your provider's cleanup not reach your own suppression list?

SparkPost's postmortem says its cleanup removed entries from SparkPost's
suppression list, and that if you also keep your own list, “you may need to
remove affected addresses there too”. Bird, which mirrors SparkPost's status
posts, carries the same text. Which entries
depends on how you build your list; the SparkPost section below gives the
filters for a copy and for events.

Of the providers whose pages we read, only SparkPost, mirrored by Bird, says its
cleanup covered only its own list. Mailgun's page says “Impacted addresses have
been removed from suppression lists.” and gives no guidance on lists a sender
keeps.

Time limits make a copy drift further. AhaSend, the sending service DMARCguard
uses, suppresses most bounces for 30 days, temporary
failures for 7 and messages that expire after repeated
attempts for 15. Each suppression carries an `expires_at`,
and [AhaSend's webhook guide](https://www.ahasend.com/blog/how-handle-email-bounces-automatically-ahasend-webhooks/)
says it is worth storing so a UI can show when a suppression ends.
[AhaSend's status page](https://status.ahasend.com/) lists no incident for
November 17: this is how one sending service expires entries, not a claim that
AhaSend was affected.

Our arithmetic, conditional on AhaSend classing a 5.1.1 of November 17 that
SparkPost calls wrong as an ordinary bounce: its own suppression would lapse on
December 17, 2026. A mirrored copy in an
application database would not lapse unless the application stored and honours
`expires_at`. We store the expiry AhaSend sends and keep no second copy of a
suppression that could outlive it.

## How do you check and clean the suppression list you keep?

Pull the entries created from the start of your provider's window, narrow them to
Apple recipient domains and the 5.1.1 reply, leave every unsubscribe and
complaint suppressed, and remove only entries that pass the removal test in
step 5. Eight steps:

1. **Find every system that keeps suppressions.** Your sending service,
   application database, CRM, data warehouse and any mail server you run: a
   provider's cleanup does not reach them. Amazon SES keeps a
   [global list and an account-level list](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/ses/latest/dg/sending-email-global-suppression-list.html).
   Its global list cannot be queried or edited, and an address drops off it on
   its own within 14 days; the account-level list is the one you can check.
2. **Pull the entries created from the start of the window.** The window is the
   period your provider gives for when it added Apple addresses to suppression
   lists. SparkPost's opens at 13:00 UTC on November 17. If your
   provider gave none, start from your first 5.1.1 to an Apple domain that day.
   A list you build from bounce events has no end time, because SparkPost says Apple was still
   returning some errors at 00:06 UTC on November 18.
3. **Narrow to Apple recipient domains.** Select recipients at
   `icloud.com, me.com, mac.com, privaterelay.appleid.com or private.icloud.com`, or at any domain whose MX host is
   `mx01.mail.icloud.com or mx02.mail.icloud.com`.
4. **Match the reply.** Narrow to entries that carry 550 5.1.1 and the text user
   not found, which leaves out the relay's other 5.1.1 replies.
5. **Apply the removal test.** Unsubscribes, complaints and other bounce reasons
   stay suppressed. [Google and Yahoo's bulk-sender rules](/blog/google-yahoo-dmarc-requirements/)
   require one-click unsubscribe for bulk marketing mail, and Apple's
   [postmaster page](https://support.apple.com/en-us/102322) tells bulk senders
   not to reactivate addresses on an unsubscribe or suppression list. Our
   reading: that is about addresses someone chose to leave, while SparkPost and
   Mailgun describe these entries as created by wrong replies.

   The test is our advice, not a source's. For `privaterelay.appleid.com`, the
   only domain a provider confirmed, an entry qualifies when it was created in
   the window, carries the user not found text, and the address delivered before
   the window.

   For every other Apple domain, including custom domains on iCloud MX, that is
   not enough. No provider names them, and a mailbox deleted that week can pass
   the test too. Add a second signal from your own data: a cluster of addresses
   at that domain, each of which had delivered recently, bouncing with the same
   reply within the same hours, or the recipient telling you mail stopped. That
   is a judgement call, not a threshold.

6. **Remove only the entries that pass the test.** The test cannot prove a reply
   was wrong: an address deleted that week can pass it too. If an entry whose
   address is in fact gone is removed, the next send is one more hard bounce to
   Apple. On Mailgun, the documentation says delivery to a removed address
   resumes until it bounces again; what happens elsewhere depends on the
   provider, and SparkPost says it no longer adds addresses for these Apple
   errors. Remove one recipient and one sending domain at a time: on AhaSend
   always pass `--domain`, and on Mailgun delete the single address.
7. **Stop it coming back.** Sync jobs, webhook replays and imports can restore
   entries. Route a sudden spike of 5.1.1 replies to one mailbox provider to
   review before it becomes a suppression;
   [our post on hard-bounce thresholds and bounce monitoring](/blog/email-deliverability-monitoring/)
   covers the monitoring side.
8. **Reissue time-bound mail.** Send a new one-time code or reset link instead of
   replaying a message that bounced on November 17.

We ran the scripts below on made-up data shaped like each vendor's documented
response, and the SQL on a throwaway database. None has run against a live
account, and the AhaSend delete command has not been run, so start with the
counts. Each script prints counts only. Where a script writes entries to a file,
only you can read it: delete the file when you finish, and keep its contents out
of tickets, chats and AI tools.

### SparkPost

SparkPost says it removed these entries from its own list, so the live list no
longer holds them; the filters below are for a copy or export you hold, or your
event feed. For a copy: source `Bounce Rule`, a recipient
at `privaterelay.appleid.com`, created in the window, ending
21:05 UTC for US accounts and 21:16 UTC for EU
accounts. For events: bounce class 10 and the reply, from
13:00 UTC, with no end.

The script reads a JSON export in the shape of SparkPost's
[Suppression List search](https://developers.sparkpost.com/api/suppression-list/)
response and calls nothing. That API treats `from` and `to` as the date an entry
was last updated, not created, so the script applies the window to each entry's
`created` field. It counts entries at all five Apple domains so you can see
them; SparkPost's postmortem names only the relay.

```bash

```

### Mailgun

Mailgun's page gives no window, so start from your own first 5.1.1 to an Apple
domain on November 17; 20:31 UTC is only when Mailgun posted. The
[bounces API](https://documentation.mailgun.com/docs/mailgun/api-reference/send/mailgun/bounces)
lists a domain's bounces and has no recipient-domain filter, so the script
filters in place. Deleting one address,
`DELETE /v3/{domain_name}/bounces/{address}`, resumes delivery to it until it
bounces again.

```bash

```

### AhaSend, the service we send through

The [CLI](https://ahasend.com/docs/cli/commands/suppressions) lists
suppressions created from a time, 100 per page, and the response carries
`pagination.next_cursor`. Its `--domain` flag is the sending domain, not the
recipient's, so the script filters the recipient domain itself and skips entries
AhaSend marks protected: unsubscribes and complaints. Needs the
`suppressions:read` scope.

```bash

```

To remove one entry that passes the test, run
`ahasend suppressions delete recipient@example.net --domain send.example.com`,
with the recipient's address and your own sending domain. Needs the
`suppressions:delete` scope. The CLI asks you to confirm each removal. Pass
`--domain` every time: the flag is optional, and without it the command deletes
the address's suppressions on every domain, unsubscribes and complaints
included.

### Your own database or CRM

Count first, by recipient domain and sending domain, then remove by the ids you
reviewed. The first query prints no address and reduces the reason text to a yes
or no.

```sql

```

The second ends in a rollback: run it once, compare the count with the ids you
reviewed, then switch it to a commit.

```sql

```

### What should you not do?

- Do not unsuppress every Apple address. A relay 5.1.1 can have an ordinary
  cause, such as the user turning forwarding off.
- Do not clear all bounces or wipe a list. Mailgun's clear-all call and
  AhaSend's `wipe` command are not part of this check.
- Do not run an AhaSend delete without `--domain`.
- Do not replay time-bound mail.
- Do not paste recipient addresses into tickets, chats or AI tools. The count
  queries above need none.

## Why is a 550 5.1.1 reply suppressed as a hard bounce?

In 550 5.1.1, the second part is the enhanced status code.
[RFC 3463 §3.2](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3463.html) defines X.1.1 as a bad
destination mailbox address and says:
“The mailbox specified in the address does not exist.” It adds that the code
suits permanent failures only.

The first part is the reply code. Under
[RFC 5321 §4.2.1](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5321.html) a 5yz reply is a
permanent negative completion, and the client SHOULD NOT repeat the exact
request. The same section notes:
“Even some "permanent" error conditions can be corrected”.

Sending services act on that. Mailgun's documentation says its
[bounce list](https://documentation.mailgun.com/docs/mailgun/api-reference/send/mailgun/bounces)
holds permanent recipient mailbox errors such as a non-existent mailbox, and
[AhaSend's](https://ahasend.com/docs/bounces) defines a hard bounce the same
way and suppresses most bounces for 30 days. The cost is
that a mistaken one removes a real recipient.

A 5.1.1 from the Apple relay can have an ordinary cause. Apple's developer
support [says](https://developer.apple.com/forums/thread/749765) a 550 5.1.1
unknown user reply likely means the user turned off forwarding for that app, and
[Resend](https://resend.com/docs/knowledge-base/sending-apple-private-relay)
lists a deleted Hide My Email address and a daily limit among the usual reasons
a relay address bounces. The relay also answers 550 5.1.1 with other text:
Apple's developer support ties unauthorized sender to sender registration and
authentication, which is why step 4 matches the user not found text. Our
reading: a relay 5.1.1 is not wrong by default, which is why a blanket
unsuppress is wrong.

## What is the timeline of the Apple bounces (UTC)?

SparkPost's suppression window opens at 13:00 UTC on November 17.
That is the start of SparkPost's window, not of Apple's errors: Mailgun gave
none. SparkPost's postmortem, posted at 00:06 UTC on November 18,
says Apple was still returning some of these errors intermittently, and we found
no later statement from SparkPost or Mailgun saying they stopped.

The providers post with different offsets: SparkPost -05:00, Bird +01:00 and
Mailgun -08:00. Every time below is converted to UTC.

<DataTable caption="Provider updates on the November 17 bounces. All times UTC.">

| When                                                     | What happened                                                                                                                                                                                       | Source                                                   |
| -------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------- |
| November 17, 13:00 UTC                                  | Start of the window in which SparkPost added Apple relay addresses to its suppression list. SparkPost's window, not Apple's                                                                         | [SparkPost](https://status.sparkpost.com/incidents/3z1rcmg1xsdb) |
| November 17, 19:45 UTC                                | SparkPost's first update: valid iCloud and Hide My Email addresses; volume had dropped sharply over the past few hours                                                                              | SparkPost                                                |
| November 17, 20:31 UTC                                   | Mailgun posts that it is removing addresses added to suppression lists during the affected time                                                                                                     | [Mailgun](https://status.mailgun.com/incidents/dk98825mys2s)     |
| November 17, 20:40 UTC                                   | SparkPost: Apple-side, addresses valid, scope `privaterelay.appleid.com`, cleanup started                                                                                                        | SparkPost                                                |
| 21:05 UTC (US), 21:16 UTC (EU) | SparkPost stops adding these addresses to its list. Not the end of the incident                                                                                                                     | SparkPost                                                |
| November 17, 22:55 UTC                                     | SparkPost: cleanup finished, and a change so that if Apple returns these errors again the addresses are not added. Bird posts the same updates at 22:09 UTC and 22:54 UTC | SparkPost, [Bird](https://status.bird.com/incidents/9ldnf5hggdpk)  |
| November 18, 00:06 UTC                                   | Postmortem: guidance for senders who keep their own list; Apple still returning some errors intermittently                                                                                          | SparkPost                                                |
| November 18, 03:58 UTC                                   | Mailgun: addresses are being removed from suppression lists                                                                                                                                         | Mailgun                                                  |
| November 18, 19:35 UTC                                     | Mailgun: impacted addresses removed from suppression lists                                                                                                                                          | Mailgun                                                  |

</DataTable>

Apple's status page the same day is shown separately, because it is not part of
the providers' account:

<DataTable caption="Apple's status page on November 17, shown separately from the provider updates. All times UTC.">

| When                                                     | What the status page showed                                                                                                                     | Source                                                 |
| -------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------ |
| November 17, 16:45 UTC              | iCloud Account & Sign In listed as an issue. An archived copy of the feed from 17:50 UTC shows it, and shows no iCloud Mail entry | [Archived feed](https://web.archive.org/web/20261117175007/https://www.apple.com/support/systemstatus/data/system_status_en_US.js) |
| November 17, 19:03 UTC | iCloud Mail and iCloud.com added, for some users. Secondary source                                                                              | [AppleInsider](https://appleinsider.com/articles/26/11/17/icloud-account-login-icloud-mail-services-are-having-trouble-today) |

</DataTable>

No source we found links Apple's outage to the bounces. The 16:45 UTC
row rests on the archived copy and the
19:03 UTC row on AppleInsider's
report.

## Were there earlier Apple incidents in 2026?

This is the third Apple incident this year that we found on SparkPost's status
page, with a suppression cleanup each time. They differ in what the pages say.

- [April 5](https://status.sparkpost.com/incidents/1g6yntvgd0qk): SparkPost
  attributed increased bounces and delays to Apple domains to an Apple iCloud Mail outage,
  then removed the Apple and Apple Private Relay suppressions from Apple's
  incident window. Its cleanup finished at 01:00 UTC on
  April 6. The page names no SMTP reply.
- [August 26 to August 27](https://status.sparkpost.com/incidents/x1gj50g5q6nq): SparkPost saw
  `550 5.1.1 user not found` from the relay,
  `privaterelay.appleid.com`, from around 23:00 UTC on
  August 26. It says `icloud.com, me.com and mac.com` were
  unaffected, that a substantial share of the addresses had delivered
  successfully as recently as August 26, and that it would remove the suppressions itself.
  It resolved the incident at 22:56 UTC on
  August 27.
- November 17: this incident. Only this incident and August's name a 5.1.1
  reply.

SparkPost announced the change, so that these Apple errors no longer add
addresses to its list, in the update that closed this cleanup.

## Why can't your DMARC reports show this?

Apple's [postmaster page](https://support.apple.com/en-us/102322) for iCloud Mail
offers no feedback loop and does not mention aggregate reports. Our own
[guide to aggregate reports](/blog/dmarc-aggregate-report/) lists Apple/iCloud as
not a documented report sender, and our own intake agrees.

<KeyStat
  stat="0"
  label="DMARC aggregate reports from Apple have reached DMARCguard for its own domains."
  source="DMARCguard report intake"
/>

That absence means something because we do send to iCloud addresses: we sent
mail to icloud.com addresses before November 17. Reports from other mailbox
providers kept arriving through the days of the incident. If reports from other
mailbox providers have stopped for you,
[check whether your reports are reaching you](/blog/dmarc-rua-collection/).

From 13:00 UTC on November 17 to the end of our data,
01:26 UTC on November 21, we sent no
mail to an `icloud.com, me.com, mac.com, privaterelay.appleid.com or private.icloud.com` address, so we received no bounce and
no suppression event for one. The check covered those five domains by name, not
custom domains hosted on iCloud Mail's MX hosts. No Apple entry was added to our
own suppression list, because we had nothing in flight to Apple in the window,
not because our setup was immune. We cannot say what Apple sent or did not send
to anyone else.

What this supports: DMARC monitoring cannot show this incident. Your bounce
events and suppression list are the record. SPF (RFC 7208), DKIM (RFC 6376) and
DMARC (RFC 9989) concern who sent a message; a user-not-found reply concerns the
recipient's mailbox. Nothing on SparkPost's or Mailgun's pages ties the bounces
to sender authentication.

## How is this different from the two Microsoft incidents?

Three mailbox-provider incidents between November 6 and
November 17 produced three different SMTP answers and three
different jobs for a sender.

<DataTable caption="Three November 2026 mailbox-provider incidents side by side. Rows marked our reading are ours, not a source's.">

| Row                        | AS9031519 (EX1545193)                                   | EX1550543                                                             | November 17 (Apple)                                                           | Basis       |
| -------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------- |
| Dates                      | Microsoft's: November 6, 18:00 UTC to November 9, 11:02 UTC | Microsoft's final posts: November 12, 10:05 UTC to November 13, 16:10 UTC | SparkPost's window from November 17, 13:00 UTC; no end stated                | Sourced     |
| Reply                      | `550 5.7.1` or `550 5.7.23`, per Microsoft                | `451 4.7.0, 421 4.3.2, 451 4.7.700`, SparkPost's list, which may not be complete | `550 5.1.1 user not found`                                                     | Sourced     |
| Class                      | Permanent, policy (X.7)                                   | Temporary                                                                 | Permanent, address (X.1)                                                      | Our reading |
| What a sender's system did | Bounced; may suppress                                     | Queued and retried                                                        | Bounced; may suppress the recipient                                           | Our reading |
| What to do                 | Fix DMARC, resend what bounced                            | Resend only what expired                                                  | Remove the entries that pass the removal test; resend only what still matters | Our reading |
| What persists              | The message                                               | The message, if it expired                                                | The recipient, until the entry expires or is removed                                | Our reading |

</DataTable>

[The AS9031519 bounces](/blog/outlook-as9031519-dmarc-bounce/) and
[our post on EX1550543](/blog/microsoft-outage-ex1550543-email-deferred/) cover
the Microsoft cases; the second lists the same suppression check as its step 5.
The table has no cause row for Apple: we found no Apple explanation of the
bounces.

A fourth event followed within days: Yahoo country domains moved to a new MX
host, and Yahoo said senders may see a spike in error responses such as a
temporary 450. That one calls for waiting, not for a list check:
[which Yahoo domains moved and what a 450 means](/blog/yahoo-mail-mx-change/).

## Frequently asked questions

### What does 550 5.1.1 user not found mean?

A 550 5.1.1 reply is a permanent refusal: RFC 3463 §3.2 defines X.1.1 as a bad
destination mailbox address, and RFC 5321 §4.2.1 says the sender should not
repeat the exact request. Sending services treat it as a hard bounce and
suppress the address. On November 17, 2026, SparkPost said Apple returned it for valid
recipients.

### Did Apple confirm what caused the bounces?

No. We found no Apple statement about the bounces. MacRumors reports that Apple
told Bloomberg an internal update caused outages the same day and that it was
not a cyberattack. No source we found links that outage to the bounces.

### Which Apple addresses were affected?

SparkPost's confirmed scope is `privaterelay.appleid.com`, the Sign in with Apple
relay. Neither provider lists another affected domain: Mailgun's page and
SparkPost's first update say iCloud addresses without naming a domain. Check
`icloud.com`, `me.com`, `mac.com`, `private.icloud.com` and any domain whose MX
is `mx01` or `mx02.mail.icloud.com`.

### Is Apple still returning the errors?

SparkPost's last statement, its postmortem posted at 00:06 UTC on
November 18, 2026, says Apple was still returning some of these
errors intermittently. We found no later statement from SparkPost or Mailgun
saying they stopped.

### Will my provider's cleanup fix my own suppression list?

Not by itself. SparkPost says its cleanup covered only its own list and that
senders who keep their own may need to remove the affected addresses there too.
Mailgun's page says its addresses were removed from suppression lists and does
not mention lists a sender keeps.

### Should I unsuppress every iCloud address?

No. For `privaterelay.appleid.com`, the domain SparkPost confirmed, remove only
entries created in your provider's window with the user not found text whose
address delivered before. Other Apple domains need a second signal, because no
provider names them. Apple's developer support says a 550 5.1.1 unknown user reply from the relay likely means forwarding was turned off. Unsubscribes and complaints stay suppressed.

### What are privaterelay.appleid.com and private.icloud.com?

`privaterelay.appleid.com` is the relay domain for Sign in with Apple addresses.
Apple said in August 2026 that new relay addresses would be issued on
`private.icloud.com` starting later in 2026 and that existing ones keep working.
Apple's June notice asked email providers to add `private.icloud.com` to
filtering and suppression rules; Apple now marks it outdated. Apple's support
page for Sign in with Apple says a Hide My Email address is created on
`private.icloud.com` or `privaterelay.appleid.com`.

### Would DMARC reports have shown this?

No. DMARC aggregate reports carry authentication results, not a recipient
server's replies, and Apple's postmaster page documents no aggregate reporting.
None of the aggregate reports that reach DMARCguard for its own domains comes
from Apple. The bounces appear in your bounce events and suppression list.
Nothing on SparkPost's or Mailgun's pages links authentication to them.

## What should you do about the Apple bounces?

- A provider's cleanup is not your list's cleanup: of the providers whose pages
  we read, only SparkPost says so. Check the lists you keep.
- Narrow the Apple recipients created in your provider's window to the user not
  found reply, and remove an entry only if it passes the test in step 5. Leave
  unsubscribes and complaints suppressed, and never wipe a list.
- DMARC aggregate reports will not show Apple user not found bounces; your bounce
  events and suppression lists are the record.

Nothing in this incident calls for a DNS change. To see each DMARC report as it
arrives, and each gap,
[start monitoring your DMARC reports](https://app.dmarcguard.io/register): free
plan, no credit card.


## Updates

- **November 21, 2026.** First published. SparkPost's latest statement on the
  incident is its postmortem of 00:06 UTC on
  November 18; Mailgun's is its resolution at 19:35 UTC on
  November 18; we found no Apple statement about the bounces.