How to Fix “DMARC Quarantine/Reject Policy Not Enabled”
If your security scanner shows “DMARC quarantine/reject policy not enabled,”
your domain’s DMARC record exists but is not enforcing anything. The record uses
p=none — a monitoring-only mode that collects reports while letting spoofed
emails reach inboxes unchanged. Tools like MXToolbox, Plesk server health
monitors, Google Postmaster, and email deliverability audit platforms all flag
this warning. You will also see it during PCI DSS compliance scans and
third-party penetration tests that evaluate your DNS posture.
This is more common than you might expect. In our scan of 5.5 million domains, only 30.4% publish a DMARC record, and only 12.8% enforce it with a quarantine or reject policy.
Source: DMARCguard State of Email Authentication 2026 — 5,499,028 domains scanned
This guide explains what the warning means, why it matters, and exactly how to
move from p=none to enforcement — with steps for six major DNS providers. If
you are not sure whether your record is at p=none,
check your current DMARC record first.
If you are troubleshooting a DMARC failure rather than a policy warning, see our DMARC failed troubleshooting guide.
What Does “DMARC Policy Not Enabled” Mean?
“DMARC quarantine/reject policy not enabled” means your DMARC record is published
but set to p=none — a monitoring-only mode that takes no action on messages
that fail authentication, so spoofed mail still reaches inboxes. The warning is
asking you to move from p=none to p=quarantine or p=reject.
A DMARC record lives as a DNS TXT record at _dmarc.yourdomain.com. It tells
receiving mail servers what to do when an email claiming to be from your domain
fails authentication. The key tag is p=, which sets your policy.
The p= tag is the most important part of a DMARC record. It is the instruction
you give to every receiving mail server in the world: “when an email claiming to
be from my domain fails authentication, here is what you should do with it.”
With p=none, that instruction is “do nothing” — deliver it anyway.
There are three policy levels, defined in RFC 9989 §4.7 (formerly RFC 7489 §6.3):
Here is what the difference looks like in DNS.
Monitoring only — triggers the warning:
"v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc@yourdomain.com" Enforcement — resolves the warning:
"v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc@yourdomain.com" The only difference between the two records is a single tag: p=none versus
p=reject. That one value changes whether receiving servers ignore or act on
authentication failures.
When security scanners flag “DMARC quarantine/reject policy not enabled,” they
are telling you that your record exists at p=none. Reports arrive, but no
email is quarantined or rejected based on authentication results.
The record works — it is syntactically valid and receivers process it. The issue
is that p=none provides visibility without protection.
Why Staying at p=none Puts Your Domain at Risk
A p=none policy means anyone can send email that appears to come from your
domain, and it reaches inboxes. Here is what that looks like in practice.
State-sponsored spoofing
In late 2023, the North Korean threat group
Kimsuky exploited domains with
p=none or no DMARC record to spearphish U.S. policy experts. They impersonated
journalists and academics at think tanks and universities, targeting government
officials and researchers working on East Asian foreign policy.
The attack was serious enough to
prompt a joint FBI, NSA, and State Department cybersecurity advisory.
The advisory’s primary mitigation recommendation: upgrade to p=quarantine or
p=reject.
Financial impact
Orion S.A., a global chemical manufacturer, lost approximately $60 million in a business email compromise (BEC) attack disclosed via SEC Form 8-K in August 2024. A non-executive employee was tricked into executing multiple fraudulent wire transfers. Industry analysis identifies this as BEC — the canonical attack type that DMARC enforcement is designed to prevent.
Caveat: The DMARC gap is inferred from the attack type, not explicitly stated in the SEC filing. If the attack used a lookalike domain rather than exact-domain spoofing, DMARC alone would not have prevented it.
The industry gap
Of 5.5 million domains we scanned, 57.9% of those with DMARC records remain at
p=none. Only 6.8% use p=quarantine and 6.0% use p=reject. The gap between
having a DMARC record and actually enforcing it is the industry’s most common
vulnerability.
Source: DMARCguard State of Email Authentication 2026 — 5,499,028 domains scanned
Beyond security, there is a practical business incentive: BIMI eligibility.
Brand Indicators for Message Identification lets your logo appear next to your
emails in Gmail, Yahoo, and Apple Mail inboxes. Moving to enforcement
unlocks BIMI logo display in Gmail and Apple Mail — BIMI
requires p=quarantine or p=reject, and p=none does not qualify.
Before You Switch — Check Your Sending Sources
Do not jump straight to p=reject. The most common concern about enabling DMARC
enforcement is breaking legitimate email — and it is a valid concern. Moving to
enforcement without preparation can quarantine or reject messages from your own
marketing platform, CRM, or support desk.
Follow these three steps before changing your policy:
Pre-enforcement checklist
-
Review your DMARC aggregate reports (RUA). These XML reports list every IP address that sent email using your domain. Look for all legitimate senders and check whether they show SPF and/or DKIM as aligned. Unknown IP addresses need investigation before you enforce.
-
Identify all third-party senders. Marketing platforms (Mailchimp, HubSpot), transactional services (SendGrid, Amazon SES), support desks (Zendesk, Freshdesk), and CRMs (Salesforce) all send on your behalf. Each must pass DKIM alignment on your domain.
-
Verify SPF and DKIM are configured for every sender. Each service should have custom DKIM signing with
d=yourdomain.com(not the service’s default domain). Custom Return-Path domains align SPF. Both are typically configured through the service’s “domain authentication” or “verified sending domain” settings.
Use a SPF checker to verify your SPF record includes all authorized senders, and a DKIM checker to confirm DKIM selectors are published and valid.
Green light signals — you are ready to enforce:
- Two to four weeks of aggregate reports show only unauthorized senders failing
- All known services pass SPF or DKIM alignment
- No legitimate senders appear in the “fail” column
Red flag signals — fix these first:
- Legitimate senders still failing authentication — configure their DKIM/SPF before enforcing
- Unknown sending sources with high message volumes — investigate before blocking
- SPF record approaching the 10-DNS-lookup limit — flatten or consolidate before
adding more
include:mechanisms
Step-by-Step — Enable Enforcement
The recommended path under RFC 9989 uses
the new t=y testing-mode tag, which covers the old pct=0 testing use
(RFC 9989 removed pct= and has no percentage-based rollout). A receiver that honors t=y applies one level below
what you published: p=quarantine; t=y is handled as p=none, and
p=reject; t=y as p=quarantine. It may mark the override as
policy_test_mode in its aggregate reports. So p=quarantine; t=y is still
effectively monitoring; real quarantining starts when you drop t=y.
Recommended rollout:
p=quarantine; t=y— quarantine in testing mode (handled asnone)p=quarantine(dropt=y) — commit to quarantine enforcementp=reject; t=y— reject in testing mode (handled asquarantine)p=reject— full enforcement
Here is the record for the first step:
"v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; t=y; rua=mailto:dmarc@yourdomain.com; adkim=r; aspf=r" The adkim=r and aspf=r tags set relaxed alignment for DKIM and SPF
respectively, meaning subdomains of your domain also count as aligned — this is
the default and the safest choice during rollout, since many third-party
services sign from subdomains like email.yourdomain.com.
Monitor your aggregate reports at each stage. If legitimate mail starts
failing, pause and fix the sender configuration before dropping t=y and
committing to enforcement.
Cloudflare
- Log in to the Cloudflare dashboard and select your domain
- Go to DNS → Records
- Find the TXT record with name
_dmarc - Click Edit and update the
p=value fromnonetoquarantine - Add
t=yafter the policy tag (RFC 9989 testing-mode signal) - Save
cPanel / WHM
- Log in to cPanel and open Zone Editor
- Find the TXT record for
_dmarc.yourdomain.com - Click Edit and change
p=nonetop=quarantine; t=y - Save the record
GoDaddy
- Go to My Products → DNS Management for your domain
- Find the TXT record with host
_dmarc - Click the pencil icon to edit
- Update the value, changing
p=nonetop=quarantine; t=y - Save
AWS Route 53
- Open the Route 53 console → Hosted zones → select your domain
- Find the
_dmarc.yourdomain.comTXT record - Click Edit record and update the
p=value - Save changes
Google Cloud DNS
- Open Cloud Console → Network services → Cloud DNS
- Select your zone and find the
_dmarcTXT record - Click Edit and update the policy value
- Save
Namecheap
- Go to Domain List → Manage → Advanced DNS
- Find the TXT record with host
_dmarc - Click Edit and change the
p=value - Save all changes
After updating
DNS changes typically propagate within 15 to 60 minutes. Use a DMARC lookup tool to verify the updated record is live. If you have a high TTL on the existing record, propagation may take up to 48 hours.
Subdomain policy (sp=): If your organization does not send email from
subdomains, add sp=reject to your DMARC record. This prevents attackers from
spoofing anything.yourdomain.com while your organizational domain is enforced.
"v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc@yourdomain.com; adkim=r; aspf=r" What About Forwarded Emails? (ARC Explained)
The most common reason organizations delay DMARC enforcement is email
forwarding. When an email is forwarded — through mailing lists, .forward
rules, or alias services — two things break:
- SPF fails because the forwarding server’s IP address is not in the original domain’s SPF record
- DKIM may break if the forwarding server modifies the message body or headers (adding footers, rewriting subjects)
When both SPF and DKIM fail on forwarded mail, DMARC fails too — even though the original message was legitimate. This creates a real problem: enforce DMARC and forwarded mail from mailing lists bounces.
ARC (Authenticated Received Chain) can help, with limits. ARC (RFC 8617, Experimental) lets forwarding servers record the original authentication results in special ARC headers, but a receiver only uses them if it trusts that forwarder, and the IETF DMARC working group is progressing a draft to reclassify ARC as Historic. Aligned DKIM remains the fix you control.
If you run mailing lists or use email forwarding extensively, you can inspect ARC headers on forwarded messages using our ARC chain analyzer, and test your own domain’s ARC readiness with the ARC checker.
For a deeper look at how ARC works and who supports it, see our ARC protocol guide.
Regulatory and Industry Pressure to Enforce
Several major mandates now require DMARC for email senders. It is important to understand what they actually require — and what they do not.
Source: .gov adoption data from DMARCguard State of Email Authentication 2026
If your organization sends bulk email, processes payments, or operates in a
regulated industry, at least one of these mandates applies to you. Even if
p=none technically satisfies the bulk-sender minimums at Google, Yahoo, and
Microsoft, the trajectory is unmistakable: every revision tightens the bar.
Here is the honest framing:
Google,
Yahoo, and
Microsoft
all explicitly accept p=none as sufficient for their bulk sender requirements.
Spamhaus’s Sender Guidelines
require a DMARC record with a policy for every sending domain and accept p=none
to start, but say not to remain at p=none permanently and recommend an
enforcement policy.
PCI DSS v4.0.1 Section 5.4.1 requires “anti-phishing mechanisms” and mentions DMARC
in implementation guidance as an example — but does not mandate a specific
policy level. Many auditors interpret p=none as insufficient because it takes
no protective action on failures, but this is an interpretation, not a
requirement.
The exception is
CISA BOD 18-01,
which requires U.S. federal agencies to reach p=reject. The result: .gov
domains lead the private sector at 76.4% DMARC adoption.
The direction is clear. Every mandate is moving toward authentication
enforcement. p=none meets the bulk-sender minimums at Google, Yahoo, and Microsoft today. p=quarantine or
p=reject is where the industry is heading — and where your domain’s protection
starts.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the difference between DMARC quarantine and reject?
Quarantine tells receiving mail servers to treat emails that fail DMARC as suspicious. In practice, this means routing them to the spam or junk folder. Reject tells receivers to block failing emails entirely — they never reach the recipient’s inbox or spam folder. Quarantine is a good intermediate step while you verify all legitimate senders pass authentication, because misrouted mail can still be recovered from spam. Rejected mail cannot.
Will enabling DMARC enforcement break my email?
It can, if legitimate senders are not configured with proper SPF and DKIM
alignment. That is why we recommend monitoring with p=none first, reviewing
aggregate reports for two to four weeks, then moving to p=quarantine; t=y
(the new RFC 9989 testing-mode tag — pct= was removed in RFC 9989, May 2026)
before committing to full p=reject. This staged approach lets you catch and
fix issues before they affect all your mail.
How long does a DMARC policy change take to propagate?
DNS changes typically propagate within 15 to 60 minutes, though some providers
may take up to 48 hours. You can verify your updated record immediately using a
DMARC lookup tool. To speed up propagation, lower your TTL (Time to Live) value
on the _dmarc TXT record before making changes — a TTL of 300 seconds (5
minutes) is a common choice during policy transitions.
Do Google and Yahoo require DMARC enforcement (quarantine or reject)?
No — both accept p=none for their bulk sender requirements. Google’s
guidelines say the DMARC enforcement policy “can be set to none” (its bulk threshold is 5,000+ messages per day), and Yahoo asks for a valid DMARC policy
“with at least p=none” (it publishes no volume number). These requirements are
a floor, not a ceiling. Meeting them keeps your bulk email from being
penalized, but enforcement is what prevents your domain from being spoofed.
Does PCI DSS v4.0.1 require DMARC?
PCI DSS v4.0.1 Section 5.4.1 requires anti-phishing mechanisms
for any organization that processes, stores, or transmits cardholder data. DMARC
is mentioned in the implementation guidance as an example approach but is not
the sole required method. The standard does not specify a DMARC policy level.
However, many QSAs (Qualified Security Assessors) interpret p=none as
insufficient anti-phishing protection because it takes no action when
authentication fails. Moving to p=quarantine or p=reject strengthens your
compliance posture.
Conclusion
The “DMARC quarantine/reject policy not enabled” warning means your domain has a
DMARC record at p=none — monitoring only, no enforcement. Reports arrive, but
spoofed emails still reach inboxes.
You are not alone: only 12.8% of the 5.5 million domains we scanned enforce DMARC.
The fix follows a clear path:
- Review your aggregate reports to identify all legitimate senders
- Verify SPF and DKIM alignment for every third-party service
- Enforce gradually —
p=quarantine; t=y(testing mode, RFC 9989), then commit by droppingt=y, then move top=reject - Update your DNS TXT record at your provider (Cloudflare, cPanel, GoDaddy, Route 53, Cloud DNS, or Namecheap)
- Keep DKIM aligned so forwarded email still passes
Enabling your DMARC quarantine or reject policy is the step that turns monitoring into protection. Every mandate is heading toward enforcement, and your domain’s security depends on making the move.
Already have a record and want to verify it? Use our DMARC checker to confirm your policy is live and propagated.