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(Updated November 3, 2026 ) by Meysam Azad
24 min read

DMARCbis Is Published: RFC 9989, 9990, and 9991 Replace RFC 7489

DMARC is now a Standards-Track Internet protocol: RFC 9989 (the new core protocol), RFC 9990 (aggregate reporting), and RFC 9991 (failure reporting) — all published May 2026 — obsolete RFC 7489. The headline changes: a DNS tree walk replaces the Public Suffix List, reporting splits into its own two RFCs, the pct, rf, and ri tags are removed, and RFC 9989 adds psd and t and carries np over from RFC 9091.

DMARCbis is the IETF name for this revision. It promotes DMARC from Informational to Proposed Standard (Standards Track) for the first time — this is the new DMARC RFC set for 2026, the canonical DMARC specification going forward.

RFC 7489 was originally published in 2015 as an Informational document. After eleven years of operational deployment and one experimental extension (RFC 9091, 2021, which added the np= tag and a PSD policy lookup — the psd= tag and the DNS tree walk are new in RFC 9989), the IETF DMARC Working Group split the protocol into three Standards-Track documents. The core authentication-and-policy work is now in RFC 9989; aggregate reporting moved to RFC 9990; failure reporting moved to RFC 9991.

This post is the day-one breakdown of what changed, why it matters, and what to do this week.

Key finding

3 RFCs RFC 9989, 9990 & 9991 obsoleted RFC 7489 and made DMARC a Proposed Standard in May 2026

Source: IETF DMARC Working Group

What Changed — at a Glance

One sentence — this is the DMARC RFC 2026 update at a glance: RFC 7489 (Informational, 2015) is replaced by three Standards-Track RFCs published — RFC 9989 (core protocol), RFC 9990 (aggregate reporting), and RFC 9991 (failure reporting). DMARCbis is also marketed by some vendors as DMARC 2.0, but the RFC numbers are the canonical reference going forward.

The mapping:

RFC 7489 (Informational, 2015)Replacement (Standards Track, 2026)
RFC 7489 §1–§6 (core protocol)

RFC 9989 Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance

RFC 7489 §7.2 (aggregate reports)

RFC 9990 DMARC Aggregate Reporting

RFC 7489 §7.3 (failure reports)

RFC 9991 DMARC Failure Reporting

RFC 9091 (experimental PSD DMARC, np= tag)

Merged into RFC 9989
Public Suffix List (PSL) lookup

DNS Tree Walk (8-level limit)

pct=, rf=, ri= tags

Removed
(no equivalent)

New tags: np= (from RFC 9091), psd=, t=

forwarded, sampled_out override reasons

Removed; policy_test_mode added

Diagram mapping RFC 7489 (Informational, 2015) to its three Standards-Track replacements published in May 2026: RFC 9989 for the core protocol, RFC 9990 for aggregate reporting, and RFC 9991 for failure reporting. RFC 9091 (experimental PSD DMARC) is merged into RFC 9989.
RFC 7489 is replaced by three new Standards-Track RFCs. RFC 9091 (experimental PSD DMARC) is folded into RFC 9989.

If you operate a DMARC record: most of your record stays valid. The v=, p=, sp=, rua=, ruf=, adkim=, aspf=, and fo= tags all keep their RFC 7489 meaning. pct=, rf=, and ri= are removed — remove them at your next DNS edit. Optionally adopt the three new tags described below.

If you process DMARC reports: the XML schema for aggregate reports (RFC 9990) gains optional fields including discovery_method, policy_test_mode, generator, and an optional envelope_from. Existing parsers usually keep working — lenient XML parsers skip elements they don’t know — but updated parsers can use the new data to reduce source-identification ambiguity.

If you build DMARC tooling: Standards-Track status changes the IETF errata process and the cadence for future revisions. Any future change goes through formal IETF review, not the Independent Submission stream that published RFC 7489 outside the IETF (RFC 9989 Appendix C.1).

Why This Matters: DMARC Is Now Standards Track

RFC 7489 was published in 2015 as an Informational RFC. The Informational status meant DMARC was a public reference document but not a formally standardized protocol — implementations couldn’t claim “Standards Track” compliance, and the IETF errata process treated it as a community spec rather than a real standard.

RFC 9989 promotes DMARC to Proposed Standard (Standards Track) for the first time. The promotion is the work of the IETF DMARC Working Group, with document editors Todd Herr (Valimail) and John Levine (Standcore LLC) shepherding the draft through more than five years of revisions; further contributors are listed in RFC 9989’s Acknowledgements section.

It took eleven years because Standards-Track promotion requires operational deployment data and demonstrated interoperability across independent implementations. DMARC had to be deployed at scale before the IETF would publish the spec as a Standards-Track RFC.

What changes for vendors and auditors: implementations can now declare compliance with a Standards-Track RFC rather than an Informational one. PCI DSS, NIS2, BOD 18-01, and other compliance frameworks can reference RFC 9989 directly as the canonical DMARC specification. The DMARC specification is now a standard, not a community document.

That distinction is operational, not aesthetic. It changes how disputes get resolved, how revisions get cut, and how tooling claims correctness.

RFC 9989 — The New Core DMARC Protocol

RFC 9989 is the new core DMARC document. It carries the same scope as RFC 7489 §1–§6 (authentication, alignment, policy, record format, organizational domain discovery) and absorbs RFC 9091 (the experimental PSD DMARC RFC that introduced np=). Read the full spec at rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9989.html.

The four substantive changes — terminology, tree walk, removed tags, and new tags — are as follows.

New Terminology You’ll See in Tooling

RFC 9989 §3.2 formalizes four terms that competing articles still write informally. Tooling, auditors, and future IETF errata will use these:

Domain Owner Assessment Policy

The formal new name for “DMARC policy” — the p= tag value ( none, quarantine, reject). RFC 9989 §3.2.

Report Consumer

Replaces “report receiver” — the entity that receives aggregate or failure reports at the address in the rua= or ruf= tag. RFC 9989 §3.2.

Monitoring Mode

The formal name for p=none. Signals: collect data, take no enforcement action. RFC 9989 §3.2.

Enforcement

The formal name for p=quarantine and p=reject collectively. Signals: act on failing mail. RFC 9989 §3.2.

The vocabulary change isn’t cosmetic. Auditors, RFC errata, and the next generation of DMARC documentation will use these terms going forward — worth adopting in internal runbooks and ticket titles so your team and your auditors are speaking the same language.

How DNS Tree Walk Replaces the Public Suffix List

RFC 7489 relied on the Public Suffix List (PSL) — a community-maintained list of public suffixes (.com, .co.uk, .github.io) — to determine the Organizational Domain for a given mail-sending domain. The PSL had two known problems: it lived outside the protocol (a Mozilla-hosted file with no formal update cadence), and changes propagated asynchronously across implementations.

RFC 9989 §4.10 (with the worked example in Appendix B.4) replaces the PSL with a DNS Tree Walk: a deterministic algorithm that walks parent domains via DNS lookups, collecting DMARC records until it reaches a PSD marker, the top of the tree, or the query limit. The discovery is in-protocol and works without an external dependency.

The walk is capped at 8 DNS queries. That number is explicit in the spec: Author Domains with more than eight labels are shortened so they never cost more than eight queries. RFC 9989 §4.10 notes that Author Domains with up to seven labels were observed in use when it was published, so the cap bounds lookup cost while leaving headroom for valid deployments.

For example, the tree walk for mail.product.example.co.uk queries:

  1. _dmarc.mail.product.example.co.uk
  2. then _dmarc.product.example.co.uk
  3. then _dmarc.example.co.uk
  4. then _dmarc.co.uk
  5. then _dmarc.uk.

The walk does not stop at the first record it finds. Unless a record carries psd=n (that domain is the Organizational Domain) or psd=y (the Organizational Domain is one label below it), the Organizational Domain is the domain with the fewest labels that publishes a DMARC record (§4.10.2). When the Author Domain has no record of its own, that Organizational Domain’s record supplies the policy: its sp=, or its np= for a non-existent subdomain (§4.10.1).

DNS Tree Walk worked example for mail.product.example.co.uk: query 1 to _dmarc.mail.product.example.co.uk returns NXDOMAIN; query 2 to _dmarc.product.example.co.uk returns NXDOMAIN; query 3 to _dmarc.example.co.uk returns a DMARC record, and with no record higher up the tree, example.co.uk (the fewest labels) is the Organizational Domain. The walk is capped at 8 DNS queries per RFC 9989 §4.10.
The tree walk replaces RFC 7489's Public Suffix List dependency with a deterministic, in-protocol algorithm capped at 8 queries (RFC 9989 §4.10).

The new psd= tag (y / n / u, default u for unknown) lets Public Suffix Operators declare their domain is itself a public suffix — important during the transition while some receivers still consult the PSL.

If your domain hierarchy spans more than a single label (most do), the tree walk discovers a parent-domain DMARC record when the leaf has none — so publish at your Organizational Domain to cover all subdomains in one record.

Removed Tags — pct, rf, ri (and the Testing-Mode Replacement)

RFC 9989 removes three tags from RFC 7489. Each had operational problems that showed up across eleven years of deployment:

  • pct= (gradual enforcement percentage) — receivers implemented this inconsistently, producing unpredictable results across mailbox providers. RFC 9989 Appendix A.6 and Appendix C.5.2 document the removal and introduce the t=y testing-mode tag, which replaces the pct=0 use case.
  • rf= (report format) — only one value (afrf) was ever defined or used. The tag was redundant.
  • ri= (report interval) — RFC 7489 only guaranteed daily reports and treated anything else as best-effort, so the requested interval was a hint, not a control. RFC 9989 removes it.

In the 5.5M domains we scanned for our 2026 State of Email Authentication research, 2.3% of DMARC records (38,749 of 1,670,975) carry an explicit non-default pct= value — the long tail of partial rollouts that never finished. The top values are pct=10 (7,513 records), pct=50 (7,346), pct=25 (4,594), and pct=5 (4,108). If your record is one of them, you have two options under RFC 9989: switch to t=y (testing mode — receivers apply one level below the published policy), or commit to enforcement and drop the percentage entirely. The percentage-based rollout model is gone.

New Tags — np, psd, t (With Value Tables)

RFC 9989 adds psd and t and carries np over from RFC 9091. Most domains can leave all three unset (defaults are safe), but each solves a specific operational problem.

np= (Non-existent subdomain Policy). RFC 9989 §4.7. Values:

ValueMeaning
noneNo enforcement on mail claiming a non-existent subdomain
quarantineQuarantine mail claiming a non-existent subdomain
rejectReject mail claiming a non-existent subdomain

If unset, np= falls back to sp= when sp= is present, otherwise to p= (RFC 9989 §4.7). Use it when you want stricter handling for non-existent subdomains than for legitimate ones (e.g., p=quarantine, sp=quarantine, np=reject).

For a deeper treatment of how these tags interact, see sp= and np= subdomain policies explained.

psd= (Public Suffix Domain). RFC 9989 §4.7. Values:

ValueMeaning
yThis domain is a public suffix (mostly ccTLDs and managed-DNS providers)
nNot a public suffix; this domain is the Organizational Domain (§4.10.2)
uUnknown (default — receivers fall back to other discovery mechanisms)

Almost no operator needs to set psd=. It exists for Public Suffix Operators (PSOs) who want to declare their domain is itself a public suffix during the transition away from PSL dependency.

t= (testing mode). RFC 9989 §4.7. Values:

ValueMeaning
yTesting: receivers apply one level below the published policy
nPolicy is applied as published (default)

Use t=y during enforcement rollout to signal to receivers that you are testing the policy. A receiver that honors it handles p=reject; t=y as quarantine and p=quarantine; t=y as none, and may report the override as policy_test_mode. t=y has no effect on p=none. So p=reject; t=y still quarantines failing mail. Drop t=y once you commit to enforcement.

RFC 9990 — Aggregate Reports Get Their Own RFC

Aggregate reporting was §7.2 of RFC 7489. It is now an independent Standards-Track RFC at rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9990.html. The separation lets aggregate reporting evolve on its own schedule without re-publishing the core authentication protocol every time the XML schema changes.

XML Schema Changes — discovery_method, policy_test_mode, generator

RFC 9990 §3.1.1 (specifically §3.1.1.3 “Report Generator Metadata” and §3.1.1.5 “policy_published”) expands the aggregate report XML schema. Existing parsers usually keep working — lenient parsers skip elements they don’t know — but updated parsers can use the new data to disambiguate source identification.

If your DMARC vendor handles raw report XML for you, skim the field list below and skip to the next section; this depth matters when you build your own parser or audit a third-party one.

  • <discovery_method> (values psl or treewalk) — signals whether the report-generator used the legacy Public Suffix List or the new DNS Tree Walk to determine the Organizational Domain.
  • policy_test_mode — a new enum value of <reason>/<type> (per RFC 9990 §3.1.6) that replaces the removed forwarded and sampled_out override reasons. Signals that the receiver applied a policy in testing mode (paired with the new t=y tag).
  • <generator> — identifies the reporting software (for example, “Example DMARC Aggregate Reporter v1.2”, the value in RFC 9990’s own example). Lets report consumers attribute schema differences to specific generators.
  • <version> (optional) — schema version.
  • <envelope_from> — not new: RFC 7489 made it required; RFC 9990 (§3.1.1.10) makes it optional and allows it to be empty for a null MAIL FROM, so parsers must stop requiring it.
  • <spf><scope>mfrom</scope></spf> element — RFC 9990 §3.1.1.13 narrows <scope> (a child element, not an attribute) to the single value mfrom and makes it optional. RFC 7489 required it and allowed helo or mfrom, so an unscoped <spf> result is now valid, not gone.
  • lang attribute on <human_result> — internationalization for human-readable strings.

DMARCguard’s aggregate-report parser reads the <np> and <discovery_method> elements in policy_published and recognises the policy_test_mode override reason. Most reports in flight today still rely on implicit PSL discovery, so the operational signal arrives gradually as generators upgrade.

If you’ve never parsed an aggregate report by hand, our walkthrough of how to read a DMARC aggregate report covers the legacy XML and is being updated for the new RFC 9990 fields as receivers emit them.

External-Destination Verification: Still Required, Now in RFC 9990 §4

RFC 7489 §7.1 already required receivers to ignore external report URIs that fail verification. RFC 9990 §4 (“Verifying External Destinations”) keeps the same check, and RFC 9991 §5 applies it to ruf=.

The mechanic: if your rua= or ruf= mailbox is at a different domain than the DMARC policy record (for example, rua=mailto:dmarc@reports.example.net on a policy record at _dmarc.example.com), the report generator must find a TXT record starting v=DMARC1 at example.com._report._dmarc.reports.example.net — published in the destination’s zone — before sending. The check applies only when the destination sits in a different Organizational Domain, and it proves the destination consents to receive reports for the policy domain. Report processors often publish a wildcard, *._report._dmarc.reports.example.net, instead.

What this means operationally: confirm your reporting endpoint hosts the external-destination verification TXT record. Without it, compliant receivers drop the external address and never send you reports.

RFC 9991 — Failure Reports Get Their Own RFC

Failure reports (also called forensic reports or ARF reports) were §7.3 of RFC 7489. They are now an independent Standards-Track RFC at rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9991.html. Failure reports carry message content, so they are privacy-sensitive — a separate spec lets the privacy and rate-limiting requirements evolve independently.

The New Rate-Limit MUST for Report Generators

RFC 9991 §2 (“DMARC Failure Reports”) makes rate-limiting a MUST: report generators MUST implement a rate limit on outgoing reports so as not to flood Report Consumers. RFC 7489 only listed rate limiting among the techniques receivers were encouraged to use.

The reasoning is in §2, §7 (Privacy Considerations) and §8.1 (Denial of Service): failure reports carry message content, which means unbounded generation creates both privacy exposure (the more reports, the more PII leaked) and DoS-amplification risk (an attacker who can trigger DMARC failures can fan them out to your ruf= endpoint).

What operators should expect: receivers may generate fewer failure reports than they used to during unusual load patterns. If you depended on every failure producing a report, your monitoring assumptions need updating.

Privacy Considerations (PII in Failure Reports)

RFC 9991 §7 adds expanded privacy guidance. It notes that many large providers limit or disable failure reports, and it strongly encourages operators that enable them to limit scope and duration, validate reporting URIs, redact message bodies and header fields, and send reports only over secure channels. The guidance is encouragement, not a MUST, but it formalizes practices the operational community has converged on.

For senders who receive failure reports for someone else’s domain — usually the result of a forwarding misconfiguration — RFC 9991 gives you a clearer basis to discard rather than archive the content. The data was never yours to retain.

For a deeper treatment of how failure reports work end-to-end, see our Authentication Failure Reporting Format (ARF) guide.

Mailing Lists and p=reject — What RFC 9989 §7.4 Says

The longstanding tension between DMARC p=reject and mailing lists is now Standards-Track text. RFC 7489 §10.5 touched on the problem in a few sentences of Informational language. RFC 9989 §7.4 expands that into a normative interoperability statement with six MUST/SHOULD requirements.

The problem: mailing lists rewrite or wrap the From: header to keep their own DMARC alignment, which breaks alignment for the original author. When the author’s domain publishes p=reject, receivers following DMARC strictly will drop legitimate list mail.

What §7.4 now requires of senders:

  • Domains publishing p=reject MUST NOT rely solely on SPF and MUST apply valid DKIM signatures — DKIM is the only authentication that survives forwarding.
  • Domains whose users post to mailing lists SHOULD NOT publish p=reject.
  • Staged rollout is SHOULD: p=none for at least one month, then p=quarantine for at least one month, comparing aggregate report disposition results before considering reject.
  • Domains that do publish p=reject SHOULD tell their users that participation in mailing lists may be hindered.

What §7.4 now requires of receivers — the genuinely new normative force:

  • Receivers MUST NOT reject messages solely on the basis of a p=reject policy.
  • In the absence of other knowledge and analysis, receivers MUST treat such failing mail as if the policy were p=quarantine.

RFC 9989 is candid that practice lags the rule: it observes that few Mail Receivers apply any mitigation to indirect mail flows, so mail relayed through mailing lists with an unmodified From: header is frequently rejected under p=reject. Treat the receiver MUSTs as the standard’s direction, not a description of what every receiver does today.

On ARC specifically: RFC 9989 §7.4 names the Authenticated Received Chain (RFC 8617) as “a prominent example” of technical attempts to preserve authentication across forwarders, but the RFC explicitly observes that “none of the methods have become widely used” as of publication. Operationally, ARC is still the best chain-of-custody tool available for forwarders that modify mail, and our deep-dive on why DMARC fails on forwarded emails and how ARC fixes it walks through the deployment. But it would misread the RFC to call ARC the “recommended” fix — RFC 9989 reserves that framing for the MUST/SHOULD list above. For where ARC sits in the broader IETF roadmap — and why DKIM2 is being drafted as its eventual successor — see our DKIM2 explainer.

15 RFC 7489 Errata Addressed in RFC 9989

RFC 9989 Appendix C.9 addresses 15 RFC 7489 errata (most are resolved in RFC 9990) — see the full erratum list at rfc-editor.org for IDs. Four that matter if you parse or generate reports, or read the discovery rules:

  • Errata 5365, 7099 and 7100 (RFC 7489 §7.2.1.1): the example aggregate report filename ended in .gz instead of .xml.gz. RFC 9990 addresses them, and its example is mail.receiver.example!example.com!1013662812!1013749130.xml.gz.
  • Erratum 5495 (§6.6.3): the policy-discovery step told receivers to query the RFC5322.From domain itself, forgetting the _dmarc prefix. That text no longer exists; the DNS tree walk replaces it. Erratum 7835 (same section) is resolved the same way.
  • Erratum 6485 (§7.2.1.1): the Report-ID grammar for the report Subject line required an RFC 5322 msg-id that the spec’s own example and reports in the wild did not follow. RFC 9990 defines its own ridtxt syntax instead.
  • Erratum 5440: several mentions of the v= tag were not, but should have been, v=DMARC1;. They are corrected in RFC 9989 and RFC 9990.

The other eight are smaller: a missing GZIP reference (5371), the IP-address regular expression that was removed (5221, 7865), the PSL search that is no longer relied on (6729), a rewritten Introduction (5151), and clarifications now handled in RFC 9990 (6439, 5229, 5774).

Errata Since Publication

RFC 9989 has two verified errata, both editorial. Erratum 9025 fixes a typo in Appendix B.2.5 (“RFC53322.From” should read “RFC5322.From”). Erratum 9150 corrects three cross-references (Section 11.6 and Appendices B.2.3 and B.2.4): the procedure for verifying external report destinations is in RFC 9990 Section 4, “Verifying External Destinations”, not Section 3.

Errata 9235, 9236 and 9237 are reported and not yet reviewed. They point out that Sections 4.7, 4.8 and 4.10.1 can be read two ways when p=, sp= or np= is missing or invalid. The text of Section 4.10.1 is what this post follows: with a missing or invalid p=, or an invalid sp= or np=, a receiver acts as if the record said p=none when it has a valid rua=, and skips DMARC when it does not. Implementations may differ until the errata are settled, so spell every p=, sp= and np= value correctly and keep a valid rua= on the record.

What To Do This Week

Most operators can finish the audit in under an hour. The four steps below are the most important ones.

1. Audit Your DMARC Record

Look up your current DMARC record with dig +short TXT _dmarc.example.com (replace example.com with your domain). Identify whether pct=, rf=, or ri= are present in the response. Note your rua= and ruf= destinations.

If your record fails the audit, our DMARC fail troubleshooting guide walks the seven most common causes — start there before touching DNS.

2. Remove pct, rf, ri If Present

Edit your DNS TXT record to drop any deprecated tags. If your record was, for example:

v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; pct=50; rua=mailto:dmarc@example.com; rf=afrf; ri=3600

The RFC 9989–clean equivalent is:

v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; rua=mailto:dmarc@example.com

If you used pct= for gradual rollout, switch to the new t=y testing-mode tag (receivers apply one level below your policy) or commit to enforcement and drop the percentage entirely. The percentage-based rollout model is gone.

3. Decide on np, psd, t (Most Domains: Leave Defaults)

Most operators do not need to set any of the new tags. The defaults are safe and backward-compatible:

  • Set np= if you currently use p=none or p=quarantine and want stricter handling for non-existent subdomains. Common configuration: np=reject. If you’re still working through enforcement, see how to fix “DMARC quarantine/reject policy not enabled”.
  • Set psd=y only if you operate a Public Suffix Domain (ccTLDs, managed-DNS providers like github.io, hosting providers offering customer subdomains). If you’re not sure, you’re not one.
  • Set t=y during enforcement rollout: receivers apply one level below your policy (reject as quarantine, quarantine as none). Drop it once you commit to enforcement.

4. Confirm Your Reporting Endpoint

Two checks:

  1. Your rua= mailbox accepts mail. Test with a dig MX on the destination domain, then send a test message and confirm delivery.
  2. Your reporting endpoint hosts the external-destination verification TXT record. Required by RFC 9990 §4 — if missing, compliant receivers stop sending reports.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is DMARCbis?

DMARCbis is the IETF revision of DMARC, published in May 2026 as three Standards-Track RFCs: RFC 9989 (core protocol), RFC 9990 (aggregate reporting), and RFC 9991 (failure reporting). Together they obsolete RFC 7489 and promote DMARC from Informational to Proposed Standard for the first time.

What replaced RFC 7489?

RFC 7489 is obsoleted by three new RFCs published in May 2026: RFC 9989 (Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance), RFC 9990 (Aggregate Reporting), and RFC 9991 (Failure Reporting). Existing v=DMARC1 records remain valid; the pct tag was removed and rf and ri are historic, so they should be removed during your next DNS update.

Is DMARC Required Now?

Specific mandates already point to DMARC: Google and Yahoo require bulk senders to publish a DMARC record (p=none is accepted), and PCI DSS 4.0 Requirement 5.4.1 cites DMARC as an example anti-phishing control. RFC 9989’s Standards-Track promotion does not create new requirements, but it gives auditors a Standards-Track RFC to cite instead of an Informational document. Practical adoption pressure still comes from receivers, not from the RFC itself.

How Do I Update My DMARC Record for DMARCbis?

For most domains: remove pct, rf, and ri if present; leave np, psd, and t unset unless you specifically need them; confirm your reporting endpoint has the external-destination verification TXT record. Existing v=DMARC1 records are backward-compatible with the new RFCs.

When Were RFC 9989, 9990, and 9991 Published?

All three were published in May 2026 by the IETF DMARC Working Group after more than five years of drafting and review. RFC 9989 obsoletes RFC 7489 (the 2015 Informational DMARC spec) and RFC 9091 (the experimental PSD DMARC RFC). RFC 9990 and 9991 carve out aggregate and failure reporting into their own Standards-Track documents so each can revise independently.

Are Existing DMARC Records Still Valid?

Yes. v=DMARC1 records remain valid under RFC 9989 — the version tag is unchanged. The p, sp, rua, ruf, adkim, aspf, and fo tags all carry the same meaning. Only pct, rf, and ri are removed; receivers ignore them rather than reject the record, so your published record keeps working through the transition.

Does RFC 9989 Have Errata?

Yes, two verified editorial errata: 9025 (a typo in Appendix B.2.5) and 9150 (three cross-references now point to RFC 9990 Section 4, not Section 3). Errata 9235 to 9237 are reported and not yet reviewed; they note that the text on a missing or invalid p, sp or np can be read two ways.

Conclusion

DMARC is now a Standards-Track Internet protocol. The eleven-year Informational era is over.

Three RFCs replace one: RFC 9989 for the core protocol, RFC 9990 for aggregate reporting, and RFC 9991 for failure reporting. Most operators only need to remove pct, rf, and ri from their DNS record — the rest is backward-compatible.

The DMARCbis publication is the rare news event in this space that changes how every DMARC vendor, auditor, and tooling author cites the specification. Verify your record against the new spec with our DMARC checker, then move on with your week.